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Temporal binding occurs when people observe two events that they believe to be 
causally connected: They underestimate the length of the interval between those two 
events, when compared with their estimates of the length of intervals between events 
they believe to be causally unrelated. I discuss temporal binding in the context of 
Dennett and Kinsbourne’s (1992) influential argument levelled at what they call 
‘Cartesian Materialism’. In particular, I argue that Dennett and Kinsbourne’s 
argument trades on a representational conception of perceptual experience, which 
blurs the boundary between perception and judgement, and that temporal binding can 
serve as a case study for developing an alternative, relational, conception of 
perceptual experience and of its relation to judgement. Based on research on the 
mechanisms underlying temporal binding, I provide an explanation of the 
phenomenon in which perception and judgement play clearly distinct roles.   
  
 2 
Temporal Binding and the Perception/Cognition Boundary 
 
The term ‘temporal binding’ refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between 
two events that occurs when these events are believed to stand in a cause-effect 
relationship to each other. That is to say, for a certain range of intervals between two 
events, people will judge those two events to occur closer together in time if they 
believe the first of them to be the cause of the second, in comparison with two events 
that they believe to be causally unrelated. Such binding was originally thought to 
occur only in the context of intentional action (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) – 
i.e. when the first of the two events is a voluntary movement and the second its 
consequence – and the effect is therefore also sometimes referred to as ‘intentional 
binding’. However, binding has since also been demonstrated to occur in scenarios 
that do not involve intentional action, but only the observation of a mechanically 
produced cause-effect sequence (Buehner, 2012). Hence, I will use the more neutral 
terminology. 
Cases such as temporal binding, in which people’s judgements about 
properties of a sequence of events don’t correctly reflect the properties the sequence 
actually has, have played a prominent role in discussions of consciousness.1 In 
particular, such cases stand at the heart of an influential argument put forward by 
Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) against a view of consciousness they term Cartesian 
Materialism and in favour of an alternative view they call the Multiple Drafts Model.2 
The focus in that context has typically been on phenomena other than temporal 
binding. In what follows, I want to suggest that reflection on the case of temporal 
binding can help make explicit and undermine a key set of assumptions underlying 
Dennett and Kinsbourne’s argument. In particular, I argue that their argument rests on 
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a representational view of perception – that is, a conception of perception on which 
perceptual experience is construed as something akin to judgement, thus blurring the 
boundary between perception and cognition. I then use the case of temporal binding to 
illustrate an alternative, relational, view of perceptual experience, by providing an 
explanation of temporal binding on which perceptual experience and judgement play 
two clearly distinct roles.   
 
1. Dennett and Kinsbourne on Cartesian Materialism 
Cartesian Materialism is also described by Dennett & Kinsbourne as a view of the 
mind as a ‘Cartesian Theatre’. This metaphor is meant to evoke the idea of a ‘stage’ 
on which mental items must appear in order to become conscious, their appearing on 
this stage constituting them being conscious. Another metaphor they also use for this 
view is that of a determinate ‘finish line’ that information must cross to enter 
consciousness. 
The structure of their argument might be summarized in terms of the following 
modus tollens: 
 
(1) If Cartesian Materialism is correct, there are two clearly separable, rival, 
explanatory hypotheses to account for cases in which people’s judgements about a 
sequence of events differ from how those sequences of events actually unfolded. 
(2) No distinction between two such separable explanatory hypotheses can be 
sustained. The difference between them is a chimera – a “difference that makes no 
difference”. 
(3) Therefore, Cartesian Materialism is incorrect.  
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In order to illustrate the reasoning behind (1) and (2), it might help to consider a 
relatively basic example, namely metacontrast masking.  
In a typical metacontrast masking experiment, participants are first asked to 
focus spatial attention on a fixation point in the centre of a screen. Following this, 
after a short delay, a circular target is displayed, typically for approx. 40ms, centred 
on the same location. Then the screen goes blank again. After a further delay, 
typically of approx. 20ms, a mask is displayed on the screen, typically again for 
approx. 40ms. This is again centred on the same spot as the circular target, but 
consists of a ring, whose inner perimeter is just slightly larger than the circular target 
was.  
 The typical finding in experiments involving such an arrangement of stimuli is 
that participants report only seeing the mask – i.e., the ring – appearing briefly on an 
otherwise blank screen. That is, they don’t report seeing the circular target that 
precedes the ring. Yet, in a control experiment in which only that target is displayed, 
for the same amount of time, but not followed by the ring, participants do report 
seeing the target. It is in this way that, in metacontrast masking, a temporally later 
stimulus influences people’s awareness of an earlier stimulus.   
 How might metacontrast masking be explained? It is natural to think that it 
could be either a misremembering effect or a misperception effect – an idea Dennett 
and Kinsbourne flesh out by distinguishing between what look like two rival 
explanatory models, which they label ‘Orwellian’ and ‘Stalinesque’, respectively. As 
they put it, the Orwellian model would have it that “[s]ubjects are indeed conscious of 
the first stimulus […] but their memory of this conscious experience is almost entirely 
obliterated by the second stimulus” (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992, p. 193). By 
contrast, the Stalinesque model would have it that “the second stimulus somehow 
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prevents conscious experience of the first stimulus (it somehow waylays the first 
stimulus on its way to consciousness). The first stimulus never gets to play on the 
stage of consciousness” (ibid.). 
 As the last sentence indicates, Dennett and Kinsbourne interpret the idea that 
there are two clearly distinguishable rival explanatory hypotheses at issue here to be a 
symptom of an implicit adoption of a ‘Cartesian Theatre’ view of the mind, and they 
think that it needs to be abandoned along with that view. As they argue, 
 
[b]oth […] models can deftly account for all the data […]. They agree about 
just where in the brain the mistaken content enters the causal pathways; […] 
they [also] both account for the subjective data – whatever is obtainable ‘from 
the first-person perspective’ – because they agree about how it ought to ‘feel’ 
to subjects: Subjects should be unable to tell the difference between 
misbegotten experiences and immediately misremembered experiences. So, in 
spite of first appearances, there is really only a verbal difference between the 
two theories. They tell exactly the same story except for where they place a 
mythical Great Divide, a point in time (and hence a place in space) whose 
fine-grained location is nothing that subjects can help them locate, and whose 
location is also neutral with regard to all other features of their theories. This 
is a difference that makes no difference. (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992, p. 
193f.) 
 
Existing critiques of Dennett and Kinsbourne’s argument have typically either 
focused on whether, contrary to them, there may not in fact be empirical ways to 
distinguish between the Orwellian and the Stalinesque model, or they have granted 
 6 
that there may not be, but argued that the implied inference from this to the claim that 
the very idea of such a distinction needs to be rejected is unjustifiably verificationist. 
My argument will take a somewhat different route. Before setting it out, though, it is 
worth saying a few words about the model of consciousness advocated by Dennett 
and Kinsbourne themselves, and isolating in particular one crucial feature of it, which, 
I will argue, plays a key background role in their argument. Here is their own 
description of that model, which they call the Multiple Drafts Model: 
 
All perceptual operations, and indeed all operations of thought and action, are 
accomplished by multi-track processes of interpretation and elaboration that 
occur over hundreds of milliseconds, during which time various additions, 
incorporations, emendations, and overwritings of content can occur, in various 
orders. Feature-detections or discriminations have to be made only once. That 
is, once a localized, specialized “observation” has been made, the information 
content thus fixed does not have to be sent somewhere else to be 
rediscriminated by some “master” discriminator. In other words, it does not 
lead to a re-presentation of the already discriminated feature for the benefit of 
the audience in the Cartesian Theater. […] These spatially and temporally 
distributed content-fixations are themselves precisely locatable in both space 
and time, but their onsets do not mark the onset of awareness of their content. 
(Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992, p. 185) 
 
The particular feature of this picture I want to highlight is that it explains the 
operation of the brain in terms of the activity of multiple distinct pieces of mental 
machinery which, at a high enough level of abstraction, can all be described as 
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performing the same general set of functions, which Dennett and Kinsbourne 
variously describe as ‘content-fixing’, ‘interpreting’ or ‘editing’ (compare also the 
metaphor of producing multiple drafts). This basic underlying assumption is not just 
involved in Dennett and Kinsbourne’s own Multiple Drafts Model. It also seems to be 
in play in the way they construe the Orwellian and Stalinesque models of 
consciousness. Only, the Orwellian and Stalinesque model, as they see it, also involve 
an additional (unwarranted) assumption, as indicated in the passage quoted above, of 
the same input going through a sequence of different such content-fixings with a step 
in it at which the relevant content becomes conscious, so that we can ask, with respect 
to a particular content, whether it was ever conscious, or whether it was ‘edited out’ 
before reaching consciousness.  
 The passage quoted above is meant as a description of brain functioning. Note, 
however, that, as a consequence of construing the basic mental operation as one of 
content-fixing, this is a view on which perception itself also becomes conceived of in 
terms of this notion. Consider, for instance, how this approach would construe an 
‘Orwellian’ explanation of metacontrast masking: On such an explanation, at the 
onset of perceptual consciousness corresponding to the time when the target circle 
was displayed, the observer is in a state with a representational content in which that 
circle figures – meaning that she is perceptually conscious of the circle. Yet, 
subsequently, this content is not retained in memory, but is instead converted to one in 
which the circle does not figure.  
Such a view, which conceives of perceptual experience as the upshot of, and 
as itself a matter of, ‘content-fixing’, essentially construes perception as something 
akin to judgement – the arriving at a representation of things as being a certain way. 
This is true as much of Dennett and Kinsbourne’s own Multiple Drafts Model as it is 
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of the Orwellian and Stalinesque models, as characterized by them. The crucial 
difference between their model and the others lies just in the fact that, on the Multiple 
Drafts Model, the representational content conscious experience is assumed to possess 
is not fixed at an arbitrarily fine-grained temporal level. As mentioned before, on that 
model, “various additions, incorporations, emendations, and overwritings of content” 
(Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992, p. 185) can occur over hundreds of milliseconds after a 
stimulus is first received by a sensory receptor, and none of them individually, 
Dennett and Kinsbourne think, should be identified with ‘the point’ at which the 
subject becomes conscious of the stimulus (or fails to do so). It is only of that period 
as a whole that we can say that it constituted the subject’s either being conscious of 
the stimulus or not, where this is construed as the subject being in a state with a 
certain representational content. 
I now want to turn to the case of temporal binding – another phenomenon that 
involves people making erroneous judgements about a property of a sequence of 
events. As I will suggest, the case of temporal binding can serve to illustrate an 
alternative, quite different conception of perceptual experience, which gives 
perceptual experience and judgement two quite distinct roles. Specifically, this 
conception allows us to give an explanation of temporal binding that locates the 
phenomenon firmly on the level of judgement, rather than perception, but an 
explanation that differs in crucial ways from the Orwellian model, as envisaged by 
Dennett and Kinsbourne.  
 
3. Temporal binding 
A typical experiment to study temporal binding involves comparing participants’ 
responses across two types of trials, often referred to as causal trials and non-causal 
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trials, respectively. In each type of trial, participants are asked to make a judgement 
about the length of an interval between two events (or about the timing of the events). 
The two types of trial differ in that, in causal trials, there is a plausible causal 
connection between the relevant events (the first of which is often an action carried 
out by the participant him- or herself), whereas in non-causal trials, it is not plausible 
that the first event is the cause of the second. What is taken as a measure of temporal 
binding is the extent to which the interval between the two events in causal trials is 
judged to be shorter when compared with the interval between the two events in non-
causal trials (in cases where these intervals were in fact of the same length).  
 There is some evidence that temporal binding is due to a slowing down of the 
pacemaker in an ‘internal clock’ used to time events. Models of timing postulating 
such an internal clock conceive of it as consisting in a pacemaker that emits pulses at 
a certain rate, which are then accumulated in an accumulator (Gibbon, Church, & 
Meck, 1984; Wearden, 2001). For a given interval, the stimulus at the onset of that 
interval causes a switch between the pacemaker and the accumulator to close, so that 
the latter starts accumulating pulses, until the stimulus at the offset of the interval 
causes the switch between the pacemaker and the accumulator to open again. Because 
temporal judgements are based on the number of pulses accumulated in the 
accumulator, they will be affected by a change in the rate at which the pacemaker 
emits such pulses. Increases in the rate of pulses will cause the interval to be judged to 
be longer, and decreases in the rate with cause it to be judged to be shorter. 
 Evidence that temporal binding may be due to a pacemaker slowing down 
during causal trials has been reported by Humphreys and Buehner (2009).3 In an 
interval estimation paradigm, they used causal trials in which participants had to press 
a button at a time of their own choosing, which was then followed, after a set interval, 
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by a tone. They compared this with participants’ performance in noncausal trials in 
which they simply heard a click, which was then again followed, after a set interval, 
by a tone. (The click was a recording of the noise made by the button press on causal 
trials.) After each individual trial, participants had to estimate the length of the 
relevant interval. As expected, Humphreys and Buehner found temporal binding: 
Participants judged interevent intervals in causal trials to be shorter than 
corresponding interevent intervals in noncausal trials. However, they also found a 
difference in the slopes at which interval estimates increased with an increase in the 
length of the actually presented interval, with the slope for causal trials being 
shallower than that for noncausal trials. As Humphreys and Buehner point out, such a 
difference in slopes is a trademark signature of different pacemaker speeds. 
 How exactly should we interpret an account of temporal binding in terms of a 
slowed down pacemaker? On the pacemaker-accumulator model, judgements about 
intervals are based on the pulses accumulated in the accumulator during those 
intervals. If, during causal trials, the pacemaker slows down, fewer pulses will be 
accumulated in the accumulator. As a consequence, intervals presented in those trials 
will thus be judged as being shorter when compared with corresponding intervals in 
noncausal trials because the latter involve no slowing down of the pacemaker. This 
explains the discrepancy of judgements in the causal and noncausal trials measured in 
temporal binding experiments.  
 
4. ‘Content-fixing’ again. 
Note that the explanation of temporal binding just sketched locates the phenomenon 
firmly on the level of judgement. As far as perception is concerned, there is nothing in 
this explanation that suggests anything other than that participants are perceptually 
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aware of the events as they happen. Indeed, their being thus aware of the events is 
plausibly what underpins the operation of the switch connecting the pacemaker and 
the accumulator. That is to say, the switch is closed when participants experience the 
first event and the switch is opened again when they experience the second event (see 
also Arstila, 2017). Moreover, if the participants experience the stimulus events as 
they happen, there is also a natural sense in which it is the case that they perceive the 
actual interval between them.  
On the account of temporal binding I have just sketched, participants are thus, 
in the causal condition, first perceptually conscious of the relevant events and of the 
actual interval between them, but when subsequently being asked to make a 
judgement about that interval, they underestimate it. On the face of it, this might look 
like a version of what Dennett and Kinsbourne call an Orwellian account. However, 
there are reasons for thinking that it would be a mischaracterization of the account to 
give it that label.  
I said earlier that one assumption made by Dennett and Kinsbourne that plays 
a crucial role in their argument is that perception is the upshot of, and indeed itself a 
matter of, ‘content-fixing’. An Orwellian account of temporal binding, as they 
conceive of it, would have it that, in causal trials, one first has a perceptual experience 
with a representational content that represents the interevent interval to have the 
length it actually has, but that this then gets transformed into a content that represents 
the interval to be shorter than it actually is. 
  I suggest that the account of temporal binding I have offered should not be 
understood in this way. In particular, nothing in that account commits us to thinking 
of perception as the upshot of ‘content-fixing’, and thus as something that itself has a 
representational content that represents things as being one way or another. Rather, 
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we can think of the role of perceptual experience here as simply that of putting 
participants into contact with the relevant stimulus events themselves – something 
that is a precondition of the interval between them having an impact on the 
participants’ cognition. It is in this sense that the events as they happen themselves 
figure in the participants’ perceptual experience. Similarly, as I said, we can think of 
participants as being perceptually aware of the interevent interval simply in virtue of 
their being aware of the relevant two events as they happen. This is different from 
their forming a representation of that interval as being of a certain length that is then 
later overwritten by a different representation of it as being of a shorter length, as an 
Orwellian account, as conceived of by Dennett and Kinsbourne, would have it. 
Rather, the point at which a representation of that interval is formed is the point at 
which participants use the number of accumulated pulses to make a judgement about 
that interval.  
The conception of perceptual experience at issue here, that I am contrasting 
with Dennett and Kinsbourne’s conception of perception as the upshot of ‘content 
fixing’, is sometimes referred to as the relational view of experience, as opposed to a 
representational view of experience.4 Travis describes it at one point as follows: 
 
[P]erception, as such, simply places our surroundings in view; affords us 
awareness of them. There is no commitment to their being one way or another. 
It confronts us with what is there, so that, by attending, noting, recognizing, 
and otherwise exercising what capacities we have, we may, in some respect or 
other, make out what is there for what it is – or again, fail to. (Travis, 2004, p. 
65, emphases in original) 
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It is by adopting a relational view of perception along these lines, I want to suggest, 
that we can avoid the conception of the mind as a Cartesian Theatre, whilst at the 
same time hanging on to the idea of a clear difference between perception and 
cognition. Take again the case of temporal binding. The relationalist can, of course, 
allow that there are a number of things that have to happen in participants’ brains in 
order for them to perceive the interevent interval in a typical temporal binding 
experiment. But just like Dennett and Kinsbourne, the relationalist will consider it a 
mistake to identify one of these brain events with the state of being perceptually 
conscious of the interval, in a way that would allow for raising the question as to what 
length that interval is represented as having by that state.5 Rather, what the relevant 
events in the brain do is enabling the interval itself to have an influence on the 
participants’ cognition, by putting those participants into the relation of awareness to 
that interval. 
The relational view of experience is sometimes criticised as leaving obscure 
the relationship between perception and judgement.6 It should be clear, though, that 
this is not a criticism that can be levelled at the account of temporal binding I have 
given. As I said, participant’s perceptual experience of the two events in the causal 
and noncausal trials can be seen to play a clear causal role in the operation of the 
internal clock: It allows the operation of the switch that determines the onset and 
offset of the interval during which pulses are accumulated in the accumulator to be 
governed by these events themselves. In this way, perceptual experience grounds the 
ability to make judgements about the interval between the events based on these 
accumulated pulses. In Travis’s words, this is how, by confronting us with what is 
there – the events – perceptual experience enables us to make out the interevent 
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interval for what it is – or sometimes for a different, shorter, interval, as it happens in 
the case of temporal binding. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Dennett and Kinsbourne’s argument trades crucially on the idea of 
‘context fixing’ as the basic mental operation. This idea also leads them to adopt a 
view of perceptual experience as the forming of a representation, thus blurring the 
boundary between perception and judgement. What I have argued, in effect, is that it 
is this assumption that we should reject. I have tried to show how adopting instead a 
relational view of perceptual experience lets us provide an explanation of temporal 
binding that invokes neither what Dennett and Kinsbourne call an Orwellian nor a 
Stalinesque explanation of temporal binding, but one which can nevertheless deliver a 
clear verdict as to whether such binding should be seen as being a matter of faulty 
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matter of erroneous judgement.   
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which participants do not only observe the cause but, at that time, also already expect the effect to 
happen. (Otherwise it is difficult to see what could trigger the relevant slowing down of the pacemaker 
during the interevent interval.) For the purposes of this essay, this is the case I will focus on.  
4 The particular account I have given of temporal binding does not straightforwardly generalize to other 
postdiction effects, but these too might be explained in ways compatible with a relational view of 
experience. For instance, in Hoerl (2015) I give an account of apparent motion that is compatible with a 
relational view (which could also be extended to the case of metacontrast masking, as discussed in 
section 1). This account makes use of the idea that temporal experience is not, as Soteriou (2013, p. 
104) puts it, homogeneous down to instants. An earlier version of something like that idea already 
figures in Shoemaker’s (1993) response to Dennett. 
5 On related issues, see also Soteriou (2013, pp. 145ff.) 
6 Questions have also been raised, however, about the way this relationship is construed on the 
alternative representational view of experience. On it, making a judgement based on a perceptual 
experience is conceived of a transition between one representational state and another akin to the 
drawing of an inference. Yet, this arguably leaves out the more fundamental sense in which perception 
provides us with a grasp of what it is our judgements are about in the first place. 
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